東アジアの分岐と統治のかたち：日本と中国Divided East Asia and Governance Models in China and Japan

Living in Japan, I often wonder how the country, which once led the world in numerous fields, managed to decline so rapidly in such a short span. Born in 1991, I belong to the generation born at the peak of Japan’s bubble economy. Looking back over my 34-year lifetime, I clearly see myself as part of the generation that has fully experienced the rise and fall of contemporary Japan.

There is nothing more challenging than analyzing the era in which one lives. Yet, even as I search my own memories, it’s evident that Japanese people used to be energetic, fairly free, and economically prosperous. However, at a certain point, cracks emerged in the rigid Japanese system, leading to a rapid decline that continues today. From my personal experience, the pivotal moment was the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, a direct extension from the collapse of the bubble economy. Fourteen years have passed since then, but today’s Japan has lost its former vitality and freedom, gradually descending into poverty. Both I and those around me are surprised and disturbed by the tangible impoverishment of Japanese society.

Generally speaking, when a nation reaches this state, significant social upheaval usually occurs. Yet strangely, Japan has not witnessed any major social change. Instead, the country remains uniformly stagnant, without substantial polarization, and despite completely dysfunctional national governance, somehow continues to effectively manage over 100 million citizens. This cannot merely be attributed to a super-aged society; I believe it involves a mental pattern running beneath society. Historically, China has had the deepest relationship with Japan, yet, in stark contrast, modern China is aggressively incorporating cutting-edge technology into its governance structure more than any other nation. Setting aside debates about right or wrong, this naturally raises the question: Why did Japan fail to adopt such a technological governance approach?

This aspect forms the basis of what I term “Japan’s lack of need for governance through advanced technology,” and my reflections on this subject emphasize a unique spiritual dimension. In other words, the structures that hold a large society together have grown in different forms, depending on the scale of a country and how its history has layered. China chose a path of governance through cutting-edge technology to maintain the system of a great power, while Japan has kept order through a spirit that runs within society. Viewing this scenario as “Japan’s lack of need for governance through advanced technology” versus “China’s necessity for governance through advanced technology,” one can discern two major diverging currents emerging in East Asia. Conversely, the difference shows whether the force that supports governance resides in spirit or in technology. This is precisely the point I wish to think through.

The reason for this emphasis is that Zhu Xi Confucianism, a variant of Confucianism originating from China, continues to exert a powerful influence on contemporary Japanese governance. At the dawn of the Edo period, the Tokugawa shogunate proactively employed Zhu Xi scholars like Hayashi Razan to systematize an ethical code emphasizing loyalty to superiors and strict hierarchical order, embedding it into the governance system. Even at the commoner level, the shogunate established collective responsibility by grouping five households together, not for mutual assistance, but as an Edo-era system of mutual surveillance. Here, “peer pressure” within communities comes into play. The institutionalization of this peer pressure later made conformity and deference to hierarchical relationships the normal condition of society. Modern history has continued to idealize this as the traditional concept of wa (和), harmony.

Moreover, the roots of adapting Zhu Xi Confucianism into a governance system also lie in historical China. Zhu Xi Confucianism is fundamentally distinct from Confucius’ original teachings in the Analects, constituting a unique philosophical school. Historically, Chinese emperors drew on Zhu Xi Confucianism and elevated it into an optimal governance philosophy. Tokugawa Ieyasu and other leaders seeking to establish a governance system for future generations adopted this philosophy, using it to justify and absolutize their power, following China’s precedent. Thus, it is crucial to recognize that Zhu Xi Confucianism significantly differs from the spirit of Confucius’ original teachings. Indeed, when discussing Confucianism in Japan, it is Zhu Xi Confucianism—not Confucius himself—that holds overwhelming influence.

From this perspective, history has already demonstrated, in both China and Japan, the remarkable effectiveness of Zhu Xi Confucianism as an ideal philosophy for national governance. It was precisely because Zhu Xi Confucianism took root that the Tokugawa shogunate endured for 260 years. Even though the shogunate’s governance was already dysfunctional by the late Edo period, no major social upheaval occurred, and the system persisted until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. I feel this historical scenario strongly resembles the current situation in Japan and anticipate similar events may recur in the near future.

An essential point here is that even after the Meiji Restoration and the establishment of a new government, the robust governance system created by the Tokugawa family proved convenient for managing citizens in the modern nation-state context. Therefore, under the leadership of Yamagata Aritomo from the Choshu domain, who gained power in the new government, this system was inherited as a rigid bureaucratic structure. Thus, the roots of Japan’s bureaucratic state run through the Zhu Xi Confucianism of the Edo period alongside its adoption of Western institutions, and this is part of what marks the culture of East Asia, known as the Confucian cultural sphere. The making of East Asian states comes into three-dimensional view only when it is read together with a context distinct from Western frameworks.

The progression from Edo-period Zhu Xi Confucianism to the Meiji bureaucratic system eventually culminated in the total mobilization system during World War II, facilitating national integration. For instance, grassroots organizations such as the Tonarigumi (neighborhood associations) and the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) spread throughout Japan, establishing a society where residents monitored and reported on each other. In the Tonarigumi, individuals who criticized the war were routinely reported by neighbors to the military police or the Special Higher Police, an act often glorified as being done “for the sake of the nation and the collective good.” Similarly, the Taisei Yokusankai used various forms of propaganda to encourage voluntary cooperation with the war effort, promoting the sacrifice of individual freedom as virtuous. This system of mobilization rested on the foundation of mutual surveillance and hierarchical order that had continued since the Edo period.

The wartime mentality of sacrificing the individual “for the country,” along with regional mutual surveillance and peer pressure, continued to influence social consciousness even after defeat in the war. Yet again, Zhu Xi Confucianism’s role remained unrecognized, quietly perpetuating itself. Democratization advanced after the war, but however much the institutions changed, no comprehensive overhaul of the system occurred. Although appearances changed significantly, the sense of order inside was carried over unchanged. Consequently, following the collapse of the bubble economy, the seemingly vanished old system reemerged. Behind this revival lies a deep layer of spirit shaped over centuries by Zhu Xi Confucian values emphasizing adherence to order—a layer resilient enough to endure within the foundations of contemporary society.

Therefore, understanding Japan through Zhu Xi Confucianism remains crucial, especially for contemporary Japan. The basic structure of the normative consciousness that took shape through historical circumstances is one that prizes “never defying authority and never disturbing wa with those around you.” As mentioned at the beginning, Japan does not employ explicit high-tech surveillance systems for citizen monitoring like China, yet its society remains remarkably stable without major disturbances. This stability results from an intensely effective mechanism by which people watch over one another and adjust individual actions, without any need for technologically driven oversight by the state. Because this mechanism rests on a spirit with historical roots and on the way this land came to be, it cannot simply be transplanted elsewhere.

After all, conformity pressure, a mechanism Japanese society has nurtured over its history, was shown throughout the twentieth century to function even at the scale of over a hundred million people, so order has been kept without governments needing to spend heavily on it. Notably, the reason major social movements arise in South Korea, another Confucian-influenced society, is tied to its national bankruptcy during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. That crisis effectively dismantled the old regime, uniquely enabling South Korea to refresh its social system among East Asian countries.

However, Japan’s seemingly robust system has already begun to collapse. Unlike other countries, Japan’s sluggish social metabolism ensures the current state of apparent stagnation will persist for some time. As I have mentioned several times, the primary catalyst for breaking through this stagnation, characteristic of earthquake-prone Japan, will likely be a massive earthquake striking a major metropolitan area. From another perspective, such an earthquake represents a necessary temporary “Great Reset” for those few genuinely considering societal transformation in Japan. In hindsight, centuries from now, this next earthquake may be recognized as the pivotal trigger for change.

So then, how will Japan and China—nations which diverged distinctly in their governance paths—progress in the future? China has been closely studying Japan’s experience from nearby, skillfully shaping its national strategies so as not to follow the same path. Nevertheless, China has already entered an aging society, and it is in a major period of adjustment under the impact of its bubble economy collapse. Observing contemporary China is akin to looking at late 1990s Japan. Deeply understanding this, China is actively striving to escape its position as the “world’s factory,” focusing instead, like late 1990s to early 2000s Japan, on exporting cultural content (soft power). The current massive popularity of LABUBU symbolizes this initial effort.

As global regions become increasingly chaotic, East Asia, despite shared Confucian influences, is already significantly diverging toward separate futures. Viewing China only through the lens of trade wars and technology-driven management of society misses the essence of the issue. This is what I think as someone living in Japan, the land with the longest historical relationship with China.